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An Environmental Competition Statute 
David M. Driesen, University Professor 
Syracuse University  
 The previous part has been concerned primarily with conserving our 
environmental legacy.  Environmental law, however, must function not only as a force 
for conservation of the good, but also as the generator of a better future.  Next generation 
environmental law embraces both preservation and dyamic and constructive change.  
Thus, the next generation of environmental law must figure out how to generate the sorts 
of changes that will create a better environmental future.  
  
 The next generation of environmental law should use economic incentives to 
creatively stimulate innovation in environmental technology.  This chapter proposes an 
Environmental Competition Statute as a means of stimulating movement toward a more 
sustainable future.  Such a statute would authorize those who achieve low emissions to 
collect the cost of achieving low emissions plus a premium from competitors with higher 
emissions.   
 
 This chapter briefly explains the value of using this mechanism.  It then canvasses 
the problems with first and second generation of enviro mental law that the 
Environmental Competition Statute can help us overcome.  A detailed description of the 
Environmental Competition Statute follows.  The chapter then turns to possible 
objections to the scheme not addressed in the previous material.  It closes with a brief 
conclusion.   
 
Value of an Environmental Competition Statute 
 
 We have achieved a number of advances in material welfare because 
entrepreneurs seek to get rich by developing and introducing innovations.  Examples 
include the cellular phone, the personal computer, and various uses of the internet.   
Innovators’ ability to gain market share through productive change is limited only by 
their imagination and capabilities in meeting potential demand.  Unfortunately, the free 
market rarely encourages innovations improving the environment, because they usually 
benefit the public as a whole, rather than particular consumers paying for favorable 
environmental changes.1   
 
 An Environmental Competition Statute has the potential to encourage contests to 
improve environmental quality comparable to the ongoi  competition to realize other 
sorts of improvements.   It aims to allow the capabilities of innovators free reign in 
improving environmental quality.  It makes it possible for anybody reducing pollution to 
realize a profit from doing so.   
 
 The statute also creates risks for those who fail to advance and innovate, 
comparable to the risks faced by non-innovators in competitive markets for non-
environmental goods and services.  Just as makers of mainframe computers must adapt to 
                                               
1 See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 98-102 (2003) (discussing 
the private market’s limitations in encouraging innovation protecting the environment) 
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 2 
the threat posed by PCs, or risk losing market share, those who fail to adopt the latest 
environmental technology should lose money to faster moving competition.  This statute 
allows environmental innovators to prosper at the expense of environmental laggards, 
thereby allowing environmental markets to function like other competitive markets.   In 
short, an Environmental Competition Statute encourages competition to improve the 
environment.   
   
Problems with the Existing Law 
 
 Most existing law allows the government officials’ timidity to limit our 
environmental achievements.2  The law authorizes federal and state officials to limit the 
amount of pollution facilities can emit.  The officials administering these laws usually 
must take the costs our most antiquated industry must face into account in thinking about 
mandating environmental change.3  They rarely, however, actively consider the economic 
benefits those with newer technologies might realiz from substantial positive 
environmental change when establishing new standards.4  As a result, even when 
modernization would generate new jobs and greatly improve the environment, 
government regulations only rarely demand significant changes in approach. 
 
 Government officials often feel obliged when setting standards for an entire 
industry to make sure that every company in an industry can meet the standards it sets.5 
While the law authorizes and sometimes requires regulations based on the achievements 
of the best performers,6 government officials tend to avoid aggressive regulation because 
of the political problems that tough standards would create7.  While in other areas 
competition tends to make the best performers the trend setters, in environmental law, 
laggards have a big influence on the quality of enviro mental performance. 
 
 This feeling of obligation and pressure from the judiciary leads to standards not 
reflecting the full capabilities industry possesses to improve environmental performance.8  
Government officials often base their regulations o the technical capabilities of pollution 
                                               
2 See ID. at 112-22 (discussing the structure and economic dynamics of government decision-making in 
detail).  
3 See, e.g., National Renderers Ass’n v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281, 1288-89 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding a 
water pollution rule arbitrary, because EPA did not adequately consider whether costs would 
affect the economic viability of medium-sized facilities). 
4 Cf. MIGUEL MENDONCA, FEED-IN TARIFFS:  ACCELERATING THE DEPLOYMENT OF RENEWABLENUCLEAR 
ENERGY 43 (2007) (Germany’s feed-in tariff system to encourage renewable energy created job growth in 
the renewable energy sector).   
5 See, e.g., National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (reversing a performance 
standard, because EPA could not adequately show that its limited data adequately took into account 
operational variables throughout the industry). 2000) (remanding because EPA ignored statutory 
commands in order to show that all sources can achieve the standards set under the most adverse 
conditions). 
6 See, e.g. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(d)(3). 
7 See, e.g., National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (remanding because EPA 
ignored statutory commands in order to show that all sources can achieve the standards set under the most 
adverse conditions). 
8 See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on Deossifying the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L. 
J. 1385 (1992). 
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control technology.  Government officials often, however, have limited knowledge of 
industry capabilities to improve environmental performance.  As a result, they tend to 
demand relatively modest improvement based on well-understood technology.  This has 
been the case, to some degree, even under statutory provisions designed to force 
technology.9 
 
 The judiciary plays a role in exacerbating this problem, because industry regularly 
litigates to challenge rules limiting their pollution.  Government officials know that 
courts can block implementation of their rules if judges find the rules unreasonable.10  
While the relevant statutes only authorize reversal of rbitrary and capricious 
discretionary decisions, courts sometimes give rules a very “hard look.”  Because 
officials cannot predict precisely how courts will apply the rather vague standards 
governing judicial review of agency rules, they tend to shy away from stringent 
requirements unless they have very good information indicating that facilities have 
known techniques available for meeting them.11             
 
 Many policy-makers associate this problem of government regulation failing to 
encourage substantial innovation with command-and-control regulation.  But this timidity 
problem also limits the achievements of emissions trading programs.  Emissions trading 
programs require government officials to set limits on the amount of pollution polluting 
facilities emit.12  The emissions trading law then authorizes polluters subject to those 
limits to avoid them if they purchase equivalent extra reductions from other facilities, 
which makes it possible to meet bureaucratically chosen limits efficiently.  Government 
officials develop these limits with the costs to old established industry of making changes 
very much in mind.  They therefore usually make demands that do not require basic 
technological changes significantly improving societal welfare.  For example, Title IV of 
                                               
9 David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation: The 
Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 14-16 
(2005) (explaining how judicial demands for a rational basis for technology-based rules have limited 
capacity to force technological innovation). 
Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 
771, 805-31 (1977) (contending that judicial requirements that agency identify at least one technology 
capable of achieving its promulgated standards limited agencies’ ability to force technology); Cf.  Note, 
Forcing Technology:  The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L. J. 1713, 1718-19 (1979) (claiming that 
state plans did force some technological improvement) . 
10 See generally Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 1243 (1999). 
12 See Michael Grubb, et al., Allowance Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme:  A 
Commentary, 5 CLIMATE POL’Y 127, 127 (2005) (describing the “allocation of allowances” as “the most . . . 
important step” for “any emissions trading system”); David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic 
Incentive Program?:  Beyond the Economic Incentive/Command and Control Dichotomy, 55 WASH. &  LEE 
L. REV. 289, 324 (1998);Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing 
the need for limits as a “necessary aspect” of “any” emissions trading program). 
Deleted: ¶
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the Clean Air Act includes a very well designed emissions trading program for sources of 
sulfur dioxide causing acid rain.  This program hasproduced some of the reductions 
needed to address the ecological problems acid rain causes, but it has not encouraged 
substantial movements toward modern renewable energy t chnologies.13  Rather, it has 
encouraged traditional end-of-the-pipe controls (scrubbers) and some modest pollution 
prevention (low sulfur coal).14  The acid rain program has not made the purveyors of the 
most promising innovative environmental technologies r ch.  So, it has not functioned to 
produce the kind of wide open competition that has enriched people with new ideas 
providing material benefits to consumers.15 
 
 The same problem of government timidity would limit the efficacy of pollution 
taxes.  Economists support pollution taxes as an efficient environmental protection 
instrument.  If the traditional U.S. antipathy toward taxes ever abated sufficiently to allow 
a pollution tax law to pass at all, government officials would have to choose the tax rates 
to apply to pollution. They would probably find it politically difficult to set rates 
sufficiently high to stimulate significant innovation in environmentally friendly 
technologies.    
 
 Existing law does not provide a continuous incentive o innovate and go beyond 
compliance.16  Even in an emissions trading program, once an operator of a facility has 
met government set pollution limits, by purchasing credits from over-complying plants or 
through local reductions, no incentive exists to go further.17  Because of this limited 
demand for credits, only a limited incentive exists to overcomply; rational polluters will 
only produce as many credits as non-complying facilities need to achieve compliance, not 
more.  The incentive to improve environmental performance lasts only until the 
compliance deadline comes up.  Emissions trading provides no incentives for net 
reductions beyond those envisioned by government officials, who set caps with limited   
information about private sector capacity for innovation.  Proponents of emissions trading 
often assert that government officials can remedy the lack of incentive for continuous 
innovation by setting new limits that apply after a compliance deadline expires.  But 
setting new limits can be politically difficult.  Industry can avoid cost by opposing fresh 
                                               
13 See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR:  THE U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM 130 (2000) 
14 See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVT’L L. REP. 10094, 
10105 (2003); Byron Swift, Command Without Control:  Why Cap-and-Trade Should Replace Rate 
Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ENVT’L L. REP. 10330, 10332 (2001) (describing scrubbers and low 
sulfur coal as the principal compliance techniques). 
15 Cf. Margaret R. Taylor, Edward S. Rubin, and David A. Hounshell, Regulation as the Mother of 
Invention:  The Case of SO2 Control, 27 L. &  POL’Y 348, 370 (2005) (finding less innovation under the acid 
rain program than under the command and control regim  preceding it); David Popp, Pollution Control 
Innovations and the Clean Air Act of 1990, 22 J. POL’Y ANAL . &  MGMT. 641 (2003) (finding more 
patenting of environmental technology under command and control than under the acid rain trading 
program, but finding a different type of innovation u der trading). 
16 See Driesen, supra note 11, at 10099-10101 (explaining in detail why a trading program fails to provide 
continuous incentives for environmental improvement); Driesen, supra note 9, at 324-327 (same). 
17 See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation:  A New Era from 
an Old Idea, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 8-9 &  n. 33 (1991) (recognizing that emissions trading tends to reach an 
equilibrium). 
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limits, and frequently does.18  Because government responses to the pressures they face 
are unpredictable, government regulation, whether by emissions trading or conventional 
approaches, does not provide a secure climate for investment and deployment of 
innovative environmental technologies, even though it has secured some significant 
incremental improvement and occasional innovations.19     
 
 A tax program would provide a continuous reduction incentive, but only for a 
limited class of innovation, those with marginal costs less than the marginal tax rate.  
Taxes would not provide good incentives for important cutting edge technologies that 
would require significant investments putting their marginal costs above marginal tax 
rates, even if such investments would lower costs and improve environmental quality in 
the long run.   
 
 The Environmental Competition Statute arises from experience with second 
generation economic incentives.  These incentives fall into two categories, negative 
incentives that penalize pollution, such as pollution taxes, and positive incentives that 
reward pollution reductions, such as subsidies.  The law, however, functions most 
dynamically when negative economic incentives fund positive economic incentives.  
Governments occasionally enacted or considered such programs during the second 
generation of environmental law.  Thus, New Zealand imposed licensing fees on fishing, 
a negative economic incentive, and used the revenue from these fees to pay fishermen to 
retire, a positive economic incentive.20  France taxed water pollution and used some of 
the revenue to fund wastewater treatment.  The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, an 
emissions trading program, probably will auction off emission allowances, and states 
may use these revenues to fund energy efficiency improvements.21  The California 
legislature considered a program, Drive +, that would impose fees upon consumers 
purchasing energy inefficient vehicles and give those fees to consumers purchasing 
                                               
18 Accord Andrew McFee Thompson, Comment, Free Market Environmentalism and the Common Law:  
Confusion, Nostalgia, and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L. J. 1329, 1359 (1996) (noting the pressures that 
bureaucrats face to overallocate allowances in a trading scheme); see, e.g., Inho Choi, Global Climate 
Change and the Use of Economic Approaches:  The Ideal D sign Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Trading and an Analysis of the European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Directive and the 
Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865, 902-03 (2005) (describing California’s RECLAIM 
program as a failure because caps were set too high); Axel Michaelowa & Sonja Butzengeiger, EU 
Emissions Trading:  Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis, 5 CLIMATE POL’Y 1, 5 (2005) (explaining 
how lobbying in the EU lead to goals in phase one of its emissions trading scheme providing for little 
departure from “business as usual” levels of carbon emissions); Grubb et al., supra note 9, at 132-33 
(same); Texas Municipal Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (involving a claim to 
additional emission allowances); Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 58 F.3d 643, 647 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (same); Madison Gas & Elec. Co. 25 F.3d 526,  (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Mononganhela Power 
Co. v. Reilly, 980 F.3d 272, 272-74 (4th Cir. 1992)  
19 See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVT’L L. REP. (Envt’l L. 
Inst.) 10094, 10103-10105 (2003). 
20 See Tom Tietenberg, Using Economic Incentives to Maintain our Environmet, 33 CHALLENGE 42, 43 
(1990). 
21 See David M. Driesen, The Changing Climate for United States Law, 1 CLIMATE CHANGE L. REV. 33, 38 
(2007) (discussing movement toward auctioning under RGGI). 
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energy efficient vehicles as a rebate.22  And finally, New Hampshire officials considered 
an Industry Average Performance System that would redistribute pollution taxes to low 
polluting companies.  The Environmental Competition Statute seeks to build on these 
cutting edge second generation reforms to stimulate incr ased innovation. 
 
 Increased innovation is important, because innovati n increases our capacity to 
address environmental problems over time and can reduce the cost of doing so.  Yet 
economists recognize that markets generally stimulate insufficient innovation.  The 
reason for this is that developers of innovation canot capture all of the benefits 
innovation creates for society.  These positive spillovers (benefits not generating rents for 
the innovator) arise because innovations can contribute knowledge that spurs additional 
innovation by competitors.23  These observations about markets’ limits in spurring 
innovation apply to the markets that first generation performance standards create and to 
the markets that second generation emissions trading programs create.  The value of 
innovation and the limits of markets in encouraging su gest the need for creative 
measures to stimulate innovation, such as the Enviro mental Competition Statute.     
 
A Description of an Environmental Competition Statute 
 
 An Environmental Competition Statutes aims to stimulate a race to the top, a 
competition to develop and deploy environmentally superior technology.  In order to 
stimulate this race an Environmental Competition Statute authorizes those producing 
products or services with low emissions to collect f es from competitors with higher 
emissions.  These fees should be sufficient to fundthe full cost of using and developing 
an environmentally superior approach and also provide a premium above that amount.  
Thus, the law would have two components.  First, it would set out a requirement that a 
relatively high polluter must pay any low polluting competitor requesting a fee a dollar 
amount equal to the amount the low polluting competitor spent to achieve lower 
emissions than the high polluter.   The low polluter could demand this fee from any 
higher polluting competitor it chooses.  Second, the legislation would set out a premium 
that the high polluter must pay beyond the low polluter’s cost.  For example, the law 
could require that upon demand any polluter with higher emissions than the competing 
company making the demand must pay the low polluter th  cost it incurred to achieve 
low emissions plus 10% of its abatement costs.   
  
 This approach would allow environmental markets to emulate the economic 
dynamics of highly competitive markets.  In such markets, firms innovate in order to take 
market share from other firms.  When they innovate successfully, they in effect take 
money from their competitors, as their revenues increase and their competitors revenues 
                                               
22 Nathaniel Greene  and Venessa Ward, Getting the Sticker Price Right:  Incentives for Cleaner, More 
Efficient Vehicles, 12 PACE ENVT’L L. REV. 289, 346 (1998). 
23 See Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation and Intellectual Property Innovation:  A 
New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMPLE J. ENVTL. L. &  TECH. 51, 56 (2006) (if a person “builds a better 
mousetrap,” others may copy it); RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE:  RISK AND RESPONSE 123-24 (2004) 
(third parties’ ability to use information makes it d fficult for inventors to keep all the value their inventions 
create).  See generally Brett Frischman & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007). 
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diminish.  The Environmental Competition Statute’s transfer payment scheme creates this 
same effect for environmental goods.   
 
 Absent such a statute, environmental markets do not produce freewheeling 
competition for market share to fully meet consumer demand for environmental goods.  
Consumers want environmental benefits, but because these benefits are public goods, 
consumers cannot purchase them in free markets.  Thus, I may want clean air, but I 
cannot pay anybody to produce it.  No one party can provide me with clean air, because  
dirty air comes about as a result of the actions of multiple actors, all or most of whom 
must cleanup to produce clean air.  This public character of environmental goods (and 
bads) distinguishes them from private goods, like an air conditioner, that one can 
purchase from a single party.   
 
 Government regulation serves to stimulate provision of the public good of 
environmental quality.  But it does so through a less dynamic mechanism than 
competition to seize market share.  It creates a demand for a discrete government-
mandated environmental improvement, which can, as we have seen, be inadequate and 
insufficiently take advantage of private sector capacity to produce environmental 
improvements.     
 
 The kind of economic dynamic the environmental competition statute provides is 
powerful.  It uses fear and greed to motivate innovati n, combining an opportunity for 
profit for innovators, and a risk of loss for those who fail to innovate as quickly as their 
competitors.   By doing this, it allows environmental law to emulate the most widely 
admired feature of free markets, its tendency to simulate technological advances bettering 
our lives.  Free markets in private goods likewise depend upon fear and greed to motivate 
technological advancements.  Opportunities for profit and fear of loss stimulate the risk 
taking that must occur in order to create significant technological advances. 
 
 Absent such a statute, each polluter often must internalize (pay for) the cost of 
pollution control itself.  But it may externalize (pass on to others) the costs of pollution—a 
degraded environment and serious public health problems.  This asymmetry discourages 
cleanup.  An Environmental Competition Statute allows polluters to systematically 
externalize the costs of pollution control, just as polluters now can externalize pollutions’ 
costs.  This cost externalization frees them to employ all their ingenuity to cleanup.   
 
 Sound principles support the idea of an Environmental Competition Statute.  In 
confronting environmental problems, we should “Do the Best We Can.”24  Too often, 
however, we settle for mediocre environmental standards, standards that demand some 
improvement, but not nearly as much as the market is capable of delivering.  This statute 
tends to foster technological progress by letting the leading edge innovators set the pace.  
Just as in a market for consumer goods and services, a firm must keep up with what the 
                                               
24 See  A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT:  A PROJECT OF THE 
CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION 57-70 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Rena Steinzor eds. 2004) 
(disussing this concept as a principal to guide enviro mental law). 
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best firms are doing or lose money, this statute lik w se requires firms to match the 
achievements of their best environmental competitors or risk financial consequences.   
This statute allows firms to profit from environmental leadership and encourages them to 
truly do the best they can in advancing environmental quality.     
 
 An Environmental Competition Statute also helps overcome problems inherent in 
the economic dynamics of regulation.  Frequently, firms resist regulation en masse and 
all regulated firms share an interest in defeating e forcement.  Since we all finance firms’ 
anti-environmental litigation and lobbying when we purchase the goods they make, they 
have a lot of resources to use in thwarting progress.  An Environmental Competition 
Statute should make about half of the polluting firms into enforcers of the statute.  It 
promises distinct economic benefits to the cleanest firms, which may lead some firms to 
support such a statute.  In these ways, an Environmental Competition Statute seeks to 
overcome the economic dynamics at the heart of regulatory failure to keep pace with 
environmentally destructive activities.25       
 
 The legislature may make the obligation to pay low pollution competitors a 
general requirement for all classes of pollutants ad industries or may instead focus on a 
particular industry and set of pollutants of concer.  Congress (or a state legislature) 
could, for example, enact an Environmental Competition Statutes focusing on all emitters 
of carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse ga causing global warming.  The 
owner of a new solar plant (for example) could collect all of the costs of plant 
construction from owners of existing power plants with higher emissions plus a premium- 
a dollar amount written into the legislation to provide a profit margin for each low 
emitter.  Similarly, makers of vehicles with low carbon dioxide emissions could demand 
that the makers of vehicles with higher emissions pay the additional costs associated with 
making their vehicles lower emitting.   
 
 Congress (or a state legislature) could enact an Environmental Competition 
Statute without amending any existing law.  It would be a means of supplementing basic 
obligations with incentives to go beyond those obligations, or of encouraging new efforts 
where little has been done (e.g. global warming).   
 
 The legislation, however, would function best if it addressed some matters of 
detail.  The legislation might define the pollutants and/or industries it applies to.  It would 
be important to define the industry in terms of broad functions, (e.g. the personal vehicle 
transportation industry), not specific market niches ( .g. sports utility vehicle makers).  
The whole point is to force transfer payments betwen companies based on 
environmental performance in meeting basic consumer ne ds.  This requires 
identification of the bounds of an industry, since only competitors must pay a low 
polluting firm under this approach.  Since consumers buying cars have a choice between 
                                               
25 See DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 113-135 (analyzing the dynamics of this failure in detail).Cf. DAVID 
GOLDSTEIN, SAVING ENERGY GROWING JOBS:  HOW ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PROMOTES ECONOMIC 
GROWTH, PROFITABILITY , INNOVATION, AND COMPETITION,172-76 (2007) (explaining how trade 
associations repress competition to profit from environmental protection and pressure the government to 
adopt weak standards or none at all). 
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sedans and Sports Utility Vehicles, for example, defining a category to include all forms 
of personal transportation makes sense.  
 
 This legislation will be most helpful in areas where we anticipate the need for 
very significant technological change.  Climate change is such an area.  Scientists suggest 
that we will need more than a 50% cut in global emissions below 1990 levels by 2050 in 
order to avoid dangerous climate change.26  Because developing countries emissions are 
expected to rise during most of this period, this may require cuts of 80% or more in 
developed country emissions.  Since carbon dioxide emissions constitute about 80% of 
the gases on warming potential basis, this implies a massive move away from fossil fuels.  
Such a move will require massive technological changes.  Other areas may also benefit 
from such an approach.  
 
 An Environmental Competition Statute will have to pr vide some guidance about 
how to compare the emissions of competing firms.  The measurement issue is not 
fundamentally different from issues in traditional regulation, where we also must figure 
out how to measure emissions and fairly take into account differences among firms.  But 
in the context of environmental competition, we may profitably treat some of the issues a 
little differently than we have in other contexts.   
 
 An important aspect of the measurement problem involves the choice of a metric 
upon which to base comparisons.  A mass-based metric will not work terribly well in this 
context.  Suppose for example, that one power plant ge erates 100 tons of carbon dioxide 
per year and another generates 200 tons of carbon dioxide per year.  One might think that 
it would be appropriate to consider the 200 ton facility as the facility with higher 
emissions and allow the 100 ton facility to collect fees from the 200 ton facility.  This 
might, however, be inappropriate.  Suppose that the 200 ton facility provides electricity to 
a million people and the 100 ton facility provides electricity to just one thousand people.  
It does not seem fair, in such a situation, to consider the larger facility the higher emitter 
just because it is big and supplies a lot of customers.  A better metric would be tons of 
carbon dioxide per kilowatt hour per year.  This would normalize emissions by the 
amount of pollution per unit of output.  In general, this should be the approach.  We 
should measure and compare emissions by the mass of emissions generated annually per 
unit of output. 
 
 Another threshold issue involves deciding whether o focus on emission levels or 
emission reductions.  This issue too, has its counterparts in existing regulatory programs.  
Regulators setting a traditional first generation performance standard can focus on future 
emission reductions, by demanding even percentage reductions from firms, meaning that 
clean firms must clean up just as much as dirty firms (in percentage terms) to escape 
                                               
26 See James E. Hansen, A Slippery Slope:  How Much Global Warming Constitutes “Dangerous 
Anthropogenic Interference, 68 CLIMATE CHANGE 269, 277 (2005) (stating that a 2°C temperature rise 
“almost surely takes us well into the realm of dangerous” climate change); Malte Meinshausen, What Does 
a 2°C Target Mean for Greenhouse Gas Concentrations?  A Brief Analysis Based on Multi-Gas Emission 
Pathways and Several Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty Estimates, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE 
CHANGE  269-270 (Hans Joachim Schellnhuber et al. eds. (2006) (estimating that limiting temperature rise 
to less than 2°C likely requires a 55% reduction below 1990 emission levels by 2050) 
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liability.  Alternatively, it can set absolute uniform emission limits, which would require 
significant reductions in firms with high baseline emissions, but much fewer reductions 
(or none at all) from relatively clean plants.27  An Environmental Competition Statute 
likewise could use levels as the trigger for liability, authorizing low emitters to collect 
payments form high emitters. Alternatively, the statute could employ an emissions 
reduction approach, basing payments on relative amounts of emission reductions after the 
program was enacted.  For reasons that appear below, a properly designed emissions 
level approach functions much better than the emission reduction approach.   
         
 The emissions level approach maximizes pressure on dirty plants to clean-up.  It 
makes them immediately vulnerable to demands for payment, even without their cleaner 
competitors undertaking any new projects, because dirty plants will, at the outset, have 
more emissions than clean ones.  If this approach is used, the statute should give plants a 
few years before any demands for payment can be mad to give owners of relatively dirty 
plants a chance to clean up to escape fee payment obligations.   
 
 An emission reduction approach works less well, because it may grandfather in 
existing emissions.  Under this approach a very dirt  coal-fired power plant could reduce 
emissions and claim a penalty from a natural gas power plant that produced fewer 
emission reductions, even if the gas-fired power plant  has lower emission levels (since 
gas is inherently cleaner than coal).  It minimizes economic dynamic pressure for 
fundamental technological changes (like fuel choices) and maximizes fairness to existing 
polluters.  It fails to force significant change, bcause it accepts the status quo baseline as 
a given.  Worse, in some contexts, it can reward dirty facilities at the expense of clean 
competition.  For example, under this approach, an existing coal-fired power plant could 
reduce its emissions slightly and then collect the cost of doing that from a zero emission 
solar facility, which cannot reduce its emissions (since it’s impossible to go below zero 
emissions).  Where such perverse outcomes are likely, the emission reduction approach 
should not be used.  By contrast, an emissions level approach maximizes pressures for 
environmental advances.   
 
 Just like emissions trading, pollution taxes, and performance standards, an 
environmental competition statute relies on accurate monitoring and reporting of 
pollution levels.  The Environmental Competition Statu e, like other economic incentive-
based approaches, will work best in contexts where reliable monitoring or estimation is 
feasible.  Provisions in the statute should require the use of the best monitoring 
techniques available.  In addition, polluters must report their pollution, not just to the 
government, but to their competitors.  This reporting will make it possible for 
competitors to compare emissions for the sake of planning environmental improvements 
to avoid fees and for the sake of deciding who to seek fees from after a low pollution 
level is achieved.  The reporting should take the form of regular postings on an internet 
page accessible to all.  Since the statute should be based on comparisons of pollution per 
unit of output level, the reporting should cover both emissions and production numbers.  
 
                                               
27 See DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 193-95 (discussing the differences betwe n percentage reduction and fixed 
level standards) 
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 Environmental Competition Statutes will have to define competitive markets for 
the sake of establishing who may collect fees from whom.  Existing environmental law 
generally regulates polluters in an industry category, ften defined by standard industrial 
classification (SIC) codes.  SIC codes, however, do not fully describe competitors in a 
system designed to reward environmentally friendly innovation and apply negative 
economic incentives to dirtier means of meeting the same consumer goal.  In some cases, 
SIC codes will be too narrow and in some cases too br ad.  Ideally, someone who 
develops a system of integrated pest management (IPM), for example, that makes it 
possible to increase crop yields with little or no pesticide use, should be able to collect a 
payment from pesticide manufacturers that compete with her to increase crop yields.  
Even if the IPM developers operate a research farm and the pesticide manufacturer 
operates a pesticide plant, the statute should regard them as competitors (or allow courts 
to develop a common law of competition based on broad principles).   
  
 The application of the statute to a well-defined group of polluters with very clear 
specific definitions of competitors would minimize disputes about who is a competitor.  
But broader definitions of competitors would produce much more innovation and 
fundamental change in how we deliver goods and services to consumers.              
 
 The legislation should forbid communication among competitors about how firms 
plan to respond to the Environmental Competition Statute.  Otherwise, they might agree 
to do nothing, thereby eliminating the incentives to compete.  Violation of these 
provisions should carry very heavy penalties, including jail terms for individuals 
committing deliberate violations.  Such communication should be regarded as proof of a 
conspiracy to prevent environmental competition in violation of anti-trust principles.  
Absent such conspiracies, some companies with advanced environmental capabilities will 
likely seize the opportunity to extract payments from competitors, thereby starting the 
race to the top.  Firms who do not view themselves as environmentally advanced may 
start beefing up their emission reducing activities out of fear of becoming a target.      
 
 The legislation should also seek to minimize litiga on by providing a dispute 
settlement mechanism, perhaps through mandatory arbitration.  Disputes may arise about 
who is a competitor and who has the lowest emission.  Those using continuous 
monitoring should be presumed to have lower emission  than competitors, unless the 
competitor can prove otherwise.  This will encourage reliable monitoring.  Still, 
legitimate disputes about how to estimate or measur emissions may arise.  So, it is 
desirable to see to it that these quarrels do not become so time consuming as to blunt the 
program’s effects.  On the other hand, actions to reduce pollution in order to get transfer 
payments or to avoid having to become a payer of one ca  prove productive even if final 
settlement is delayed.    
 
 An Environmental Competition Statute will not generat  complicated 
environmentally fruitless disputes.  The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, otherwise known as Superfund, has a reputation 
for generating vexing disputes.  This United States federal law makes a variety of parties 
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associated with a toxic waste site responsible for that sites cleanup.  This has often led to 
protracted disputes about how to apportion liability among potentially responsible parties.   
  
 Superfund, however, has been a notable success in ncouraging parties not to 
create new toxic waste dumps since its enactment in 1980.28  An Environmental 
Competition Statute would likely stimulate a comparable scramble to avoid liability.   
  
 The principle causes of protracted disputes and high transaction costs under 
Superfund would not exist under an Environmental Competition Statute.  Allocating 
responsibility under Superfund has proven difficult because obtaining good information 
about the past history of toxic waste dumps (who dumped, who allowed dumping, etc.)  
has proven difficult and the program creates great uncertainty about the eventual 
cleanup’s scope.  By contrast, the Environmental Competition Statute will apply to 
facilities where the responsibility for pollution clearly belongs with the owner of the 
facility.  It usually will not prove difficult to determine pollution levels, because pollution 
is ongoing, not past, and liability will only arise after cleanup is completed and 
documented and the costs completely known.  Furthermore, one can structure an 
Environmental Competition Statute to limit the parties involved to as few as two— ne 
defendant and one plaintiff, thus avoiding the multiparty litigation that has bedeviled the 
Superfund program.   
 
Concerns Such a Statute May Raise 
 
 Competition offers great prospects for gains and advancements.  But it also 
involves change.  And change can excite fear.   
 
 While an environmental competition statute may increase jobs in companies 
employing new low emission approaches, it can conceivably cause job losses and even 
bankruptcy in high pollution companies.  In other areas of life, we accept occasional job 
losses as the price to pay for improvement.  Hence, obody argues that we should throttle 
the personal computer to stave off job losses in the typewriter industry.  If we accept 
these sorts of consequences as the price of progress in delivering better consumer goods 
or services, we should accept them, when necessary, as a sometimes necessary cost of 
environmental progress.   
 
 Congress (or a state legislature) could, however, seek to protect workers from 
some of competition’s potential consequences, just as it has protected workers from the 
consequences of some other market-based environmental measures.  When Congress 
enacted the acid rain trading program, it recognized that the flexibility this program 
offered electric utilities would probably lead to more use of low sulfur coal.  While this 
was good for miners in regions producing low sulfur coal it was not good for miners in 
regions producing high sulfur coal.  Decreased demand for high sulfur coal could lead to 
                                               
28 See Klaus Lindegaard, Environmental Law, Environmental Globalization, and  
Sustainable Techno-Economic Evolution, in ENVIRONMNET, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 141 
(Andrew Tylecote & Jan van Der Straaten eds. 1998) (reporting a 51.8% reduction in waste generation 
between 1981 and 1985). 
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job losses in the regions producing it.  Accordingly, Congress provided transitional 
assistance to high sulfur coal miners when it passed th  acid rain program.   
 
 If Congress wishes to protect workers from the consequences of competition, 
however, the legislation providing this protection should reach all form of competition, 
not just environmental competition.  If we wish to have a more humane policy with 
respect to the disruptions a competitive economy gives rise to in peoples’ lives, it should 
be a broad form of protection that helps workers hurt by all sorts of market change, not 
just that produced by environmental laws creating competitive market dynamics.  
 
 When an Environmental Competition targets one form f pollution, those 
reducing or eliminating the target pollutant may respond with measures that create 
different risks than the statute targeted.  This problem is not unique to the Environmental 
Competition Statute; it arises under first and second generation programs as well.  Still, 
regulators should anticipate problems that might arise under such a statute.  For example, 
if they do not wish to encourage payments from coal-fired power plant operators to 
nuclear power plants, because of the risks involved in nuclear power, they should draft 
provisions prohibiting that.  Unanticipated problems, however, can arise in any program 
that affords industry technological choices. 29    
 
 The Environmental Competition Statute I have outlined lacks a clear cost 
constraint.  Under the pure form of this approach sketched above, clean producers can 
collect the cost of their cleanliness from dirty competitors no matter how costly the clean 
approach happened to be.  A lack of cost constraint may be useful when addressing 
extremely serious problems that require substantial i novation, like global warming.   
 
 In practice, however, such a statute would not produce entirely unconstrained 
costs.30  Producers seeking to introduce cleaner processes must make sure that those 
processes are not so expensive as to bankrupt them. If they go bankrupt, they are not a 
competitor who can claim compensation for cleanup.  They also must spend money 
before they collect it and some risk exists that their competition may cleanup as well, so 
there remains some risk in spending too much without realizing sufficient improvements 
to collect from a competitor with some financial capability to make the required 
payments.  Even though these economic constraints wll apply in practice, the statute will 
still leave opportunities for those confident that they can beat their competitors’ 
environmental performance without insane expenditures.   
     
 Additional cost constraints would limit the statute’s effectiveness, but still leave 
scope for significant improvements.  The best way to provide an additional cost 
constraint would be to make after the fact adjustmen s if costs prove excessive.  An ex-
post approach would make the program respond to actual osts, rather than cost 
projections, which often prove inaccurate.  This constitutes a substantial advantage.  The 
adjustments could include suspending the program, putting a price cap on transfer 
                                               
29 See David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument:  Dirty Input Limits, 22 HARV. ENVTL . L. 
REV. ___ , ____(2009) (forthcoming) 
30 See DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 158. 
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payments, or limiting the premium paid above the cost of pollution control.  All of these 
measures, however, would compromise the program’s environmental effectiveness.     
  
 A jurisdiction enacting an environmental competition statute must also decide 
how to address emissions generated by activities outside the jurisdiction enacting the law.  
This concern arises because most markets feature competition across geographic 
boundaries.  These issues are complicated enough that identifying an industry with 
substantial competition solely within a jurisdiction as a target for early experiments with 
an Environmental Competition Statute commends itself as a strategy.  Under this 
approach, only facilities within the regulating jurisdiction could collect fees and only 
facilities with that jurisdiction would have to pay.  We will see, however, that it is 
possible to handle interjurisdictional competition more robustly.  
 
     Before describing the interjurisdictional issue  and ways of addressing them, 
it’s worth noting that traditional environmental law, including emissions trading, faces 
similar issues.31  Thus, for example, when EPA required the reformulation of gasoline to 
reduce air emissions from cars, effectiveness requid that refiners outside the United 
States also reformulate their gasoline.32  Otherwise, gasoline from foreign refiners sold in 
the United States would undermine the program’s effectiveness.  Accordingly, the United 
States required foreign refiners to comply.33  Similarly, traditional regulation has to 
address transboundary impacts of production facilities’ direct pollution, and usually has 
done so by some process of agreements among jurisdictions.  Yet, we shall see that these 
old issues take a slightly different shape in the context of an Environmental Competition 
Statute. 
 
 It seems clear that a government has jurisdiction to demand that polluters with its 
territory pay polluters with lower emissions, as required by an environmental competition 
statute.  This jurisdiction would suffice to justify demanding that polluters within the 
jurisdiction enacting an Environmental Competition Statute pay polluters outside the 
jurisdiction with lower emissions as well as within it.  But the question of whether a 
jurisdiction may demand payments from polluters outside its jurisdiction to polluters 
within the jurisdiction may prove more complex.  For example, assume that a petroleum 
refinery in California produces carbon dioxide emissions.  It competes with refineries in 
Texas to sell oil on the interstate market.  California might want to force its polluters to 
compete to reduce refinery carbon dioxide emissions.  This would require that California 
law allow Texas refiners to collect fees from California refiners with lower emissions, 
which is not jurisdictionally problematic, since the collection would be against a 
California facility under California law.  But it’s not as clear that California would have 
regulatory jurisdiction to demand that Texas refiners pay California refiners with lower 
emissions.  The same question could arise on the national level.  For example, could the 
                                               
31 See, e.g., Ozone Depleting Chloroflurocarbons, Proposed Production Restriction, 45 Fed. Reg. 66727, 
66732-33 (1980) (discussing options for addressing imports of ozone depleting chemicals under a proposed 
trading scheme to reduce their domestic production). 
32 See George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 618-619 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (explaining that “anti-
dumping” provisions of the Clean Air Act required tha  both foreign and domestic refiners comply).  
33 See id. (describing and resolving controversy over compliance methodologies for foreign refineries). 
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United States demand that Venezuelan refiners pay U.S. refiners with lower emissions 
under a U.S. Environmental Competition Statute? 
 
 As a general matter, states may tax foreign polluters for activities within the state.  
Thus, California, for example, would have jurisdiction to force a Michigan car company 
that sells automobiles in California to pay another car company that also sells cars in 
California for pollution from the cars driven or sold in California.34  It’s possible that 
California could also regulate a company that contribu ed emissions that affected 
California.35  But this category might include any company in the world that emitted 
carbon dioxide, so courts might be tempted to limit the reach of such an exercise of 
regulatory jurisdiction.  In the climate change context emissions everywhere affect any 
state’s welfare.  Outside of that context, a state might have difficulty regulating facilities 
outside this jurisdiction that compete with facilities in the jurisdiction, but emit nothing 
that affects the regulating states.36  Either a state or federal government would have to 
consider limiting its program to embrace less than the entire market that its companies 
compete in under an Environmental Competition Statute.  Even with such limitations in 
place, such programs would spur a great deal of innvation.  And Congress possesses the 
authority to remove impediments to state Environmental Competition Statutes arising 
from the Dormant Commerce Clause, the source of most of the potential restraints just 
mentioned.37     
 
 Furthermore, states could reach informal agreements or create interstate compacts 
with Congressional approval to broaden the reach of t eir programs.  And nations could 
broaden the reach of their programs through treaties.    
  
 Both states and federal governments would have to conform their programs to 
relevant law encouraging free trade.  Nation states mu t conform to World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreements, such as the General Ag eement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade and Servic s (GATS), and regional trade 
agreement.  Similarly, the states in the United States must conform to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, which infers limits on state regulation 
and taxation from Congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce.  Under all of 
these free trade legal regimes, polities usually manot discriminate against companies 
outside their jurisdiction.38  This means that governments must resist the temptation to 
                                               
34 The problems underlying this discussion would arise if the Supreme Court applied its Dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence to the Environmental Competition Statute.  Since this state does not tax—
it does not raise revenue for the state—it’s not entir ly clear that the all of the principles of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause tax jurisprudence would apply to it.   
35 See National Geographic Society v. California Bd. Of Equalization, 430 U.S. 561 (1997) (requiring only 
some “minimum connection” between the state and the tax d entity); Walter Hellerstein, Deconstructing 
the Debate over State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 13 HARV. J. L. &  TECH. 549, 552  (2000) 
(discussing the consensus among tax scholars that states should be able to tax companies having no 
physical presence within the taxing state).  461 375   
36 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (holding that states cannot impose a sales or use 
tax on a company lacking a physical presence in a state), 
37 See id. at 318. 
38 See Healy v. Beer Inst, 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to discriminatory 
measures). 
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make an Environmental Competition Statute a one-way street, absent a very strong 
justification.39  If states demand that out-of-state companies with hig  emissions pay in-
state companies with low emissions, they must also demand that in-state companies with 
high emissions pay out-of-state companies with low emissions.  Programs that reach out-
of-state polluters must be carefully crafted to avoid adverse rulings under free trade law 
and to conform to limits on state regulatory jurisdiction.  
 
 Many countries prohibit the government from taking private property without just 
compensation.  In most places, this poses no problem for an environmental competition 
statute, because this approach does not involve a government taking of private property.  
The United States Supreme Court, however, has created a unique body of law based on 
the idea that if government regulation goes “too far” it constitutes a taking triggering a 
government compensation duty.  Companies would probably challenge this law as a 
taking, both in the United States and possible in Ca ada and Mexico, under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement.  But this challenge should fail.  The Supreme Court has 
held that laws requiring monetary transfers without requiring transfer of particular 
property do not implicate the takings clause.40  NAFTA tribunals are extremely 
unpredictable, but they should not go beyond U.S. law on this, as Canada and Mexico 
have no regulatory takings doctrine and there’s no firm support for such a doctrine in the 
text of the NAFTA agreement. 
 
 A challenge on substantive due process grounds should also fail (a possibility in 
the U.S., at least).  The U.S. Supreme Court upholds al  laws having a mere “rational 
basis” under this doctrine.  Seeking to advance enviro mental protection through 
competition may be controversial, but it certainly meets the minimal standards for 
rationality that govern substantive due process cases.41   
 
 While the Court has upheld laws transferring funds from companies to other 
private parties, it has struck down an especially unfair retroactive application of one such 
law.42  Given the changing composition of the Court and the concern the Court has 
expressed about retroactive legislation, designers of Environmental Competition Statutes 
might wish to limit the creation of retroactive liab lity that might appear unfair to the 
Court.   A simple way to do this is to allow three years after the law goes into effect 
before any liability can apply, which sound design demands anyway.  This gives those 
potentially subject to liability an opportunity to reduce their emissions and thus their 
liability, and avoids retroactive liability.  After all, the law’s purpose is to stimulate 
                                               
39 See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1987) (invalidating an Ohio tax credit given only to 
local ethanol producers, in spite of a claim that te credit helped protect the environment). 
40 See Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539-47, 554-58 (1998) (concurring and dissenting 
opinions). 
41 See generally Collins v. City of Marker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (unanimous opinion) 
(discussing Court’s reluctance to expand the substantive due process doctrine). 
42 Compare Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Connolly, 475 U.S. 211 (1986) (upholding requirement that 
private companies fund retirees’ pensions after terminating a retirement plan); Usery v. Elkhorn Mining 
Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding requirement that mining companies compensate former employees with 
black lung disease) with Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. 498 (striking down retroactive liability for black 
lung disease for a company that never promised health protection from Black Lung disease). 
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emission reductions, not payments.    The prospect of payments serves only as a means 
toward the ends of stimulating competition to clean up.        
 
Conclusion 
 
 An Environmental Competition Statute has the capacity to unleash private sector 
capacity to improve the environment with little reliance on frequently lethargic 
government processes.  In this sense it emulates fre  market dynamics more faithfully 
than emissions trading, the signature reform of second generation environmental law.  It 
allows firms exercising environmental leadership to r sper, thereby discouraging 
laggards from resisting change.  It can help usher in a more successful third generation of 
environmental law.     
  
